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Abstract
We analyze the eﬀect of the projected demographic transition on the political support
for social security, and equilibrium outcomes. Embedding a probabilistic-voting setup of
electoral competition in the Diamond (1965) OLG model, we ﬁnd that intergenerational
transfers arise in the absence of altruism, commitment, or trigger strategies. Closed-form
solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates, a rising share
of pensions in GDP, but eventually lower social security beneﬁts per retiree. The response of
equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old-age consumption risk. Calibrated
to match features of the U.S. economy, the model suggests that, in response to the projected
demographic transition, social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16 percent; other
policies that distort labor supply will become less important; and in contrast with frequently
voiced fears, labor supply therefore will rise.
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1“Your estimated beneﬁts are based on current law.
Congress has made changes to the law in the past and
can do so at any time.”
(Social Security Statement distributed by the U.S. So-
cial Security Administration, 2007)
1 Introduction
Many countries with pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced social security systems are confronted with a sec-
ular decline in population growth rates that puts increasing ﬁnancial stress on these systems.
Projections of social security shortfalls in those countries typically imply that solvency will even-
tually require increases in contribution rates or cuts in beneﬁts (or a combination of the two).
The questions are, which of these options will be implemented, and what the macroeconomic
consequences will be. In this paper, we develop a robust analytical framework to address these
questions. Moreover, we apply this framework to generate predictions for the medium-term
outlook of the U.S. social security system.
Beneﬁt levels and contribution rates, among many other parameters of social security sys-
tems, are politically determined and may at any time be altered in the legislative process. In
order to predict adjustments of social security taxes and beneﬁts, it is therefore essential to model
the determinants of the political support for social security, and the eﬀect of the demographic
transition on these determinants. To this purpose, we introduce political choice in Diamond’s
(1965) overlapping generations model. We solve for the politico-economic equilibrium and an-
alyze the response of both policies and the allocation to an exogenously given demographic
transition.
Households in the model are non-altruistic. As consumers, they take prices and policy in-
struments as given. As voters, they anticipate the eﬀect of policy on equilibrium outcomes
including future political choices. We assume that voters are not bound by past political de-
cisions. The politico-economic equilibrium therefore features subgame-perfect tax and transfer
choices supporting a competitive equilibrium.
Agents hold rational expectations. Voters, in particular, are fully aware of the equilibrium
relationship between future state variables and policy choices, and this relationship shapes their
preferences over contemporaneous policy choices. We posit that only fundamental state variables
aﬀect future policy outcomes, excluding artiﬁcial state variables of the type sustaining trigger
strategy equilibria. Our underlying assumption is that, while the existence of social security
programs may also owe to reputational forces, changes in the size of these programs depend more
directly on the economic and political environment than through underlying trigger strategies.
Focusing on the Markov perfect equilibrium, we aim at identifying the fundamental and robust
forces that determine this size, without relying on arbitrary assumptions about the parameters of
a trigger strategy.1 In fact, the Markov perfect equilibrium we focus on is the unique equilibrium
arising in the limit of the ﬁnite-horizon economy.
We model electoral competition under the assumption of probabilistic voting. The policy
platforms of vote-seeking candidates therefore cater to the interests of all voters in society,
1The Markov assumption also reinforces our assumption that political choices suﬀer from a lack of commit-
ment, including commitment to particular trigger strategies. For a discussion of Markov perfect equilibrium, see
Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull (1997). Bhaskar (1998) shows that weak informational constraints in overlapping
generation games with a strictly dominant action for the old imply that the unique pure strategy equilibrium is
in Markov strategies.
2reﬂecting both support for social security beneﬁts by the elderly and opposition against them
by young tax-payers. However, young voters oppose social security less emphatically than old
voters support it, and the politico-economic equilibrium therefore features a structural “bias”
in favor of intergenerational transfers. This bias arises because social security taxes do not
only generate a cost for workers, but also indirect beneﬁts: By depressing savings, taxes allow
to monopolize the supply of capital and thus, to manipulate the terms of trade with future,
unborn generations.2 The resulting bias is a robust feature. It persists even if an additional
policy instrument is available that distorts labor supply and thus, depresses savings without
transferring resources to the elderly.
Voters internalize only those general-equilibrium eﬀects of transfers that materialize dur-
ing their lifetimes; negative consequences borne by subsequent cohorts (due to lower capital
accumulation) remain unaccounted for. The pro-transfer bias in politico-economic equilibrium
therefore is a reﬂection of the fact that the cost of social security is partly shifted to the future.
In contrast, a Ramsey government with “dynastic” welfare weights (that is, with welfare weights
reﬂecting households’ time preference and cohort sizes) internalizes all general-equilibrium ef-
fects. The social security tax rate implemented by such a government therefore typically falls
short of the tax rate in politico-economic equilibrium.
Demographic change alters factor prices and changes the relative weights that the politi-
cal process attaches to the interests of old and young voters. Under standard functional form
assumptions, we are able to characterize the resulting transition dynamics of the economy in
closed form. (This stands in sharp contrast to most of the literature which characterizes politico-
economic equilibria numerically. When we relax the functional form assumptions and thus, have
to resort to numerical solutions, we ﬁnd our central results to be robust.) The model predicts
a slowdown of population growth to be associated with (i) higher social security tax rates, (ii)
a rising share of pensions in GDP, (iii) but eventually lower social security beneﬁts per retiree.
The endogenous response of tax rates to demographic shocks also aﬀects the allocation of con-
sumption risk in the economy. In fact, (iv) old-age consumption risk is lower in politico-economic
equilibrium than in a situation where tax rates are constant. These eﬀects are sizeable. When
calibrated to match stylized features of the U.S. economy, the closed-form solutions of the model
suggest that (v) social security tax rates will gradually increase to around 16 percent. Moreover,
while the social security system will absorb a growing share of GDP, (vi) the importance of other
policy instruments with a distortive eﬀect on labor supply will decline. As a result, (vii) labor
supply will continue to rise until leveling oﬀ in two decades or so.
These ﬁndings have important implications for the debate about social security reform.
Participants in that discussion have identiﬁed several feasible policies that would restore solvency
of the U.S. social security system. According to the 2006 Annual Report of the Social Security
Board of Trustees3, for example, “the projected inﬁnite horizon shortfall [of social security] could
be eliminated with an immediate increase in the combined payroll tax rate from 12.4 percent
to about 16.1 percent” (p. 55). According to the well publicized reform proposal by Diamond
and Orszag (2005), to name another example, tax rates could gradually be increased to around
2In addition to altering the terms of trade, the change of savings induced by higher taxes also translates into
future policy changes if policy depends on this state variable. Kotlikoﬀ and Rosenthal (1990) discuss the incentive
of young workers to monopolize the supply of capital. They assume commitment and do not model the political
process. Cooley and Soares (1999) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), among others, stress the role of general
equilibrium eﬀects.
3The 2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, see http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
315.4 percent and beneﬁts cut by up to 9 percent.4 The model developed in the present paper
predicts that equilibrium tax rates will gradually increase to a level of around 16 percent. In
light of the two above-mentioned scenarios, this implies that beneﬁts will be cut, but most likely
by less than 9 percent.
Participants in the reform debate have also discussed the eﬀects of social security tax rates
on labor supply. Many observers have voiced fears that further tax hikes might imply large
deadweight losses, rendering the option of raising social security taxes essentially infeasible.5
The model developed in the present paper partially refutes this view. It shows that the link
between social security tax rates and labor supply distortions must not be seen in isolation but
in the context of a wider set of policy instruments. More speciﬁcally, it predicts that—because
of deadweight losses—higher social security tax rates will go hand in hand with fewer other
sources of labor market distortions; this will have a positive net eﬀect on labor supply.
Our work extends a growing literature on dynamic politico-economic equilibrium, with voters
sequentially choosing their preferred policies under rational expectations about the eﬀect on
future equilibrium outcomes (see, for example, Krusell et al., 1997; Hassler, Rodr´ ıguez Mora,
Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2003). Moreover, it relates to an extensive literature on the sources of
political support for intergenerational transfers. Typical explanations in this literature rely on
altruism or commitment (see, for example, Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989; Hansson and Stuart,
1989; Conesa and Krueger, 1999; Tabellini, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2002). Alternatively,
they view the political process as representing the interests of a tax-paying median voter who
fears that the provision of future beneﬁts hinges on the provision of current ones. According to
this view, the link between current and future beneﬁts arises because successive median voters
coordinate on a suﬃciently eﬀective trigger strategy (as in Bohn (1999), Cooley and Soares
(1999), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), or Rangel (2003)), or on the self-fulﬁlling expectation
that higher savings, due to lower current social security contributions, trigger a beneﬁt cut (as
in Forni (2005)).
Our approach diﬀers from these models. It does not rely on altruism, commitment, expected
punishments, or an inﬁnite horizon, nor does it restrict policy choices to be binary or popula-
tion growth to be suﬃciently high (to render the economy dynamically ineﬃcient, as do some
previous models). Moreover, our approach generates closed-form solutions; fully characterizes
the transition dynamics; and introduces multiple policy instruments, allowing to investigate
(in contrast to previous literature) whether the political support for social security is robust.
These advantages are largely the consequence of the probabilistic-voting assumption which pro-
vides a means to capture gradual diﬀerences in the support for social security even in a stark
two-period-lived overlapping-generations environment.6
The median-voter setup does not oﬀer all of these advantages. In median-voter models fea-
turing a few overlapping generations of homogeneous agents, demographic change of plausible
magnitude does not alter the identity of the median voter.7 As a consequence, it induces policy
adjustments only to the extent that general equilibrium eﬀects of ageing (on prices and the
social security system’s internal rate of return) alter the median voter’s preferred policy. But
4Diamond and Orszag’s (2005) proposal also deals with other dimensions of the social security system that are
absent in our model.
5See, for example, Feldstein (2005).
6Grossman and Helpman (1998), among few other authors, have embedded probabilistic voting in a model of
intergenerational transfers. Grossman and Helpman’s (1998) model does not feature economic choices.
7Tabellini (2000) considers an economy with heterogeneous agents within cohorts as well as weak, bidirectional
intergenerational altruism. In his model, a decrease in population growth reduces the wealth of the median voter
and raises the equilibrium tax rate. Tabellini’s (2000) model does not feature production.
4these general equilibrium implications typically work in the direction of reducing equilibrium
tax rates (Cooley and Soares, 1999; Forni, 2005), which is counterfactual in light of the his-
torical experience.8 In median-voter setups incorporating a large number of generations, in
contrast, demographic ageing of plausible magnitude does change the identity of the median
voter, introducing a mechanism to increase equilibrium tax rates (Galasso, 1999). However,
these setups become analytically intractable and render the analysis of multi-dimensional policy
spaces problematic.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present the model and
characterize politico-economic equilibrium. For ease of exposition, we ﬁrst consider a simpliﬁed
setup with inelastic labor supply and a single policy instrument (Section 2) before solving the
full-ﬂedged model in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the Ramsey benchmark, and Section 5
contains the quantitative results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an overlapping generations economy inhabited by cohorts of representative agents.
Households live for two periods, as workers when young and retirees when old. Workers in
period t inelastically supply labor at wage wt and pay a labor income tax levied at rate τt.
(Later, we will relax the assumption of inelastic labor supply.) Disposable income is allocated to
consumption, c1,t, and savings, st; the latter yields a gross rate of return, Rt+1. When retired, old
households consume c2,t+1, equal to the gross return on savings, stRt+1, plus pension beneﬁts,
bt+1. The population grows stochastically at the rate νt −1, such that the ratio of young to old
households is given by νt > 0.
Output is produced using an aggregate production function with constant returns to scale.
Output per worker in period t positively depends on the capital-labor ratio which, in turn, is
given by the ratio of per-capita savings of the cohort born in t − 1, st−1, and the gross rate
of growth of cohort t, νt. Factor markets are competitive and factor prices thus correspond
to marginal products. The wage and the gross interest rate are given by wt = w(st−1/νt)
and Rt = R(st−1/νt), strictly increasing and decreasing in the capital-labor ratio, respectively.
Conditional on prices and policies (which may depend on the realization of νt), the indirect
utility function of a worker in cohort t is given by
Ut = max
st
u(c1,t) + βEt[u(c2,t+1)], (1)
subject to the budget constraints described above. The felicity function u( ) is continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and concave, and satisﬁes limc→0 u′(c) = ∞. The discount
factor β ∈ (0,1), and Et[ ] denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available
at time t.
The government sector consists of a social security administration running a pay-as-you-go
system:9 Old-age pensions are ﬁnanced out of payroll taxes paid by workers such that the budget
constraint of the social security administration reads
bt = τtνtwt. (2)
8Median-voter models featuring a few overlapping generations also imply, counterfactually, drastic policy
reversals once the identity of the median voter changes.
9Introducing a fully funded component of social security is inconsequential, as long as the government does
not force households to save more than they would voluntarily save, and investment opportunities are the same
for households and the social security administration.
5(The balanced budget assumption is convenient, but not important. We discuss the reasons in
the Conclusions.) For the time being, we assume that the sole policy instrument of the social
security administration is the payroll tax rate, τt. This tax rate is determined in the political
process (described in more detail below), subject to a non-negativity constraint, τt ≥ 0.
The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of period t, after the realization of νt has
been observed, a political candidate is democratically elected to choose the contemporaneous
tax rate. When deciding which candidate to support, voters anticipate how each candidate’s
policy platform would aﬀect subsequent economic and political decisions. The wage rate and
the return on the predetermined savings of retirees, together with the tax rate implemented
by the winning candidate, determine the consumption of retirees and the disposable income of
workers. Workers then turn to their role as consumers and choose how much to save.
When supporting a candidate’s policy platform (as voters) and choosing savings (as con-
sumers), workers form expectations about future beneﬁts, bt+1. In a Markovian equilibrium,
these beneﬁts depend on a set of fundamental state variables, St+1: bt+1 = νt+1w(st/νt+1)τ(St+1).
Clearly, st and νt+1 are elements of St+1, since both variables aﬀect future wages and returns and
therefore, incomes of next period’s voters, and since νt+1 aﬀects next period’s beneﬁts. Having
said this, we conjecture st and νt+1 to be suﬃcient for St+1, i.e., τ(St+1) = τ(st,νt+1). We will
return to this point later when discussing the political institutions in place.10
To characterize the politico-economic equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction. We
start by analyzing the economic choices subject to given prices and policies, and then consider
the preferences over policies (and thus, prices) and their aggregation in the political process.
2.1 Choice of Individual Savings
The optimal savings decision of a worker in cohort t is characterized by the Euler equation
u′(c1,t) = βEt[Rt+1u′(c2,t+1)].
Since households are atomistic they take aggregate savings and thus, next period’s return on
capital as well as social security beneﬁts as given. Households only take into account that
individual savings increase ﬁnancial wealth.
Conditional on τ(st,νt+1), the Euler equation maps disposable income, wt(1 − τt), and ag-
gregate savings into the optimal savings of an individual household. We denote this mapping
by the function
Si(wt(1 − τt);st,τ(st,νt+1)).
An equilibrium aggregate savings function, S(wt(1 − τt);τ( )), is deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of the
functional equation S(y;τ( )) = Si(y;S(y;τ( )),τ(S(y;τ( )),νt+1)) ∀y ≥ 0.
2.2 Choice of Tax Rate
To characterize society’s choice of program size, we ﬁrst consider the welfare implications of the
choice of τt for workers and retirees. These welfare implications induce group-speciﬁc preferences
over policies. In a second step, we consider the aggregation of these preferences in the political
process.
Retirees prefer as high a tax rate as possible. This follows directly from the fact that bt
increases in τt, while st−1Rt is independent of τt and the tax bill for funding the beneﬁts is
10We assume τ( ) to be single-valued, as is the case in the limit of the ﬁnite-horizon economy.
6solely shouldered by workers. For a retiree in period t, the welfare eﬀect of a marginal increase
in the tax rate is given by
u′(c2,t)wtνt. (3)
For workers, a change in the tax rate gives rise to more complex welfare implications. Dif-
ferentiating Ut with respect to τt yields












dτt       
Bt
. (4)
(An envelope argument implies that the indirect welfare eﬀects through changes in the worker’s
savings cancel.) The ﬁrst, negative term reﬂects the cost of higher tax payments. The second,
“general-equilibrium” term Bt reﬂects the welfare implications due to induced changes in aggre-
gate savings: By shifting disposable income from workers (with a positive marginal propensity
to save) to retirees (with a propensity equal to zero), an increase in the tax rate reduces aggre-
gate savings. This increases next period’s expected return on savings, with a positive welfare
eﬀect for workers, and alters expected social security beneﬁts, with welfare eﬀects whose sign
is ambiguous in general. The total general equilibrium eﬀect Bt thus is positive, as long as the
anticipated political choice of beneﬁts does not strongly increase with aggregate savings.11
The extent to which the group-speciﬁc welfare implications of the choice of tax rate govern
the equilibrium policy choice depends on the political institutions in place to aggregate voters’
preferences. Previous literature has generally adopted the median-voter assumption according
to which, in our context, equilibrium outcomes exclusively reﬂect the interests of workers (as
long as νt > 1). This assumption would imply that the welfare eﬀect for workers as given in (4)
must exceed zero over some range to sustain positive taxes in equilibrium. But this condition
can only be satisﬁed if either the interest elasticity with respect to savings is very high, or the
eﬀect of higher taxes on the subsequent political choice of beneﬁts is strong and positive. Several
authors have assumed the latter, often introducing artiﬁcial state variables that allow to sustain
trigger strategies and thus, arbitrarily large elasticities of future beneﬁts with respect to current
choices of tax rate.12
Median-voter models with homogeneous agents in each cohort require a large number of
overlapping generations in order to being able to capture not only the general equilibrium
implications of demographic change, but also the consequences of the associated shift in polit-
ical power. As discussed in the introduction, models with such a large number of overlapping
generations typically have shortfalls along other dimensions. We therefore opt for a diﬀerent
modeling strategy, replacing the median-voter setup by the probabilistic-voting assumption.
Probabilistic-voting models acknowledge the fact that voters support a candidate not only for
her policy platform, but also for other characteristics like “ideology” that are orthogonal to the
fundamental policy dimensions of interest.13 The valuation of these other characteristics is as-
sumed to diﬀer across voters (even if they agree about the preferred policy platform) and to be

















12See, for example, Cooley and Soares (1999), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), or Rangel (2003). Forni (2005),
in contrast, restricts the set of state variables to the fundamental state variable. He ﬁnds that, over some range,
multiple policy functions can exist, whose steep negative slope is suﬃcient to generate the desired eﬀect.
13These characteristics are permanent and cannot be credibly altered in the course of electoral competition.
7subject to random aggregate shocks, realized after candidates have chosen their platforms. This
renders the probability of winning a voter’s support a continuous function of the candidate’s
policy platform, in contrast to the median-voter setup, and allows to analyze multi-dimensional
policy spaces (as is done in Section 3).
In the probabilistic-voting Nash equilibrium, two candidates maximizing their respective vote
shares both propose the same policy platform. This platform maximizes a convex combination
of the welfare of all voters, with the weights reﬂecting the group size and the sensitivity of voting
behavior to policy changes.14 Groups that care a lot about policy relative to the candidate’s
other characteristics have more political inﬂuence since they are more likely to alter their support
in response to small changes in the proposed platform. In equilibrium, these groups of “swing
voters” thus tilt policy in their own favor. If all voters are equally responsive to changes in
the policy platform, electoral competition implements the utilitarian optimum with respect to
voters.
In the context of our model, the probabilistic-voting assumption implies that the welfare of
retirees receives some weight in the objective function maximized by political candidates, even
if the median voter is a worker. This implication is very realistic. Indeed, it is frequently argued
in the context of social security that retirees exert stronger political inﬂuence per capita than
workers because intergenerational transfers are more of a salient issue for old than for young
voters (see, for example, Dixit and Londregan (1996, p. 1144) and Grossman and Helpman (1998,
p. 1309)). While this is reassuring, our results do not require retirees to exert disproportionate
inﬂuence.
Formalizing the foregoing discussion, the policy platform proposed by the political candidates
solves the program maxτt≥0 W(st−1,νt,τt;τ( )) where






st = S(wt(1 − τt);τ( )),
τt+1 = τ(st,νt+1),
household budget constraints.
Here, the per-capita political weight of retirees relative to workers, ω, reﬂects the sensitivity of
the voting behavior of both groups; the household budget constraint incorporates the beneﬁt,
wage, and return functions; and next period’s policy choice as a function of the state is taken
as given, reﬂecting our assumption of Markov equilibrium. An interior solution to this program
is characterized by the condition that the weighted sum of (3) and (4) (where the weights are






be equal to zero. Expression (5) features two components: The direct beneﬁt (as perceived
by the political candidate) of redistributing resources from young to old households; and the
indirect beneﬁt due to the induced general equilibrium repercussions aﬀecting young voters.
Note that our earlier assumption according to which st and νt+1 are the only elements in St+1,
indeed is consistent.
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the anticipated policy function coincides with the
optimal one. A rational expectations equilibrium is thus given by a ﬁxed point τ( ) of the
functional equation τ(st−1,νt) = argmaxτt≥0 W(st−1,νt,τt;τ( )) ∀st−1,νt ≥ 0.
14See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for discussions of probabilistic voting.
82.3 Equilibrium
To derive closed-form solutions, we impose the following functional form assumptions:15
Assumption 1. Preferences are logarithmic: u(c) ≡ ln(c). The production function is of the
Cobb-Douglas type: w(s/ν) ≡ A(1 − α)(s/ν)α, R(s/ν) ≡ Aα(s/ν)α−1, A > 0,0 < α < 1.
Here, α denotes the capital share, s/ν the capital-labor ratio, and A the level of productivity.
Under Assumption 1, a worker’s savings si
t is characterized by the condition
1






t + (1 − α)τt+1st
 
.
(We use the fact that νt+1wt+1 = stRt+1(1 − α)/α.) Imposing equilibrium, si




















  z(τt,et), (6)
implying


















t (α + (1 − α)τt) ≡ sα
t−1ν1−α
t   δ(τt).
If current and future tax rates were chosen under commitment, these equations would repre-
sent the equilibrium aggregate savings and consumption functions. In politico-economic equilib-
rium, in contrast, these equations represent the equilibrium aggregate savings and consumption
functions only under the condition that future tax rates are independent of inherited savings,
τ(st,νt+1) = τ(νt+1). We conjecture, and later verify, that this is indeed the case.
Omitting terms independent of the policy choice τt, the political objective function W( )
then reduces to
W(st−1,νt,τt;τ(νt+1)) ≃ ω ln[δ(τt)] + νtEt [ln[γ(τt,et)] + β ln[z(τt,et)α]]










15For a more general discussion, see Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2005).
16Parallel to (5), this marginal eﬀect can be decomposed in two components, one reﬂecting the direct distributive

















α + (1 − α)τt+1
 
.
9Note that, as a consequence of the additive separability of ln[γ(τ,e)] and ln[z(τ,e)], the derivative
dW( )/dτt is independent of anticipated future tax rates, et, although et aﬀects workers’ savings
and consumption choices.
The tax rate maximizing W( ) therefore satisﬁes
τW(νt) ≡
ω(1 − α) − νt(1 + αβ)α
ω(1 − α) + νt(1 + αβ)(1 − α)
.
If this tax rate violates the non-negativity constraint, then the constrained maximum of W( )
is attained for τt = 0 since the objective function is strictly concave. The equilibrium tax rate
therefore equals τW
t ≡ max(τW(νt),0), and the equilibrium policy function indeed is independent
of st, verifying the conjecture.
This equilibrium policy function, τ(st−1,νt) = τW
t , is the unique equilibrium policy function
if we restrict attention to (the limit of) ﬁnite-horizon economies.17 To see this, consider the ﬁnal
period, T say. The consumption of old and young households in this period is given by
c1,T = wT(1 − τT) = A(1 − α)(sT−1/νT)α(1 − τT),
c2,T = Asα
T−1ν1−α
T (α + (1 − α)τT),
respectively. If c2,T/c1,T exceeds ω in the absence of transfers, then the equilibrium tax rate is
in a corner, τT = 0. Otherwise, the tax rate is set to achieve
c2,T
c1,T
= ω ⇒ τT =
ω(1 − α) − νTα
ω(1 − α) + νT(1 − α)
.





which is independent of savings in period T − 1. But if the policy function in period T is in-
dependent of sT−1, then the policy function in period T − 1 is independent of sT−2 as well, as
shown before. In particular, this latter policy function is given by τW
T−1. The same logic applies
in all preceding periods.
It is straightforward to show that τW
t increases in ω and decreases in α, β and νt. Intuitively,
the political beneﬁt of taxes increases with the relative weight the political process attaches to
retirees (ω), while the political cost of taxes and depressed capital accumulation increases with
the weight attached to the future (β) and to those who care about the future (νt). At the same
time, an increase in the capital share (α) lowers the marginal beneﬁt of transfers for retirees and
increases the marginal cost of taxation for workers, thereby reducing the equilibrium tax rate.




= (1 − α)τW
t .
The model therefore predicts that the pension share is decreasing in the number of workers
relative to the number of retirees. This result ﬁnds support in the data. Analyzing the rise
of the welfare state in a sample of 30 countries during the 1880–1930 period, Lindert (1994)
ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the pension share and the share of the elderly.
A sample of OECD countries during the 1960s and 1970s (Lindert, 1996) and a panel of 60
countries during the 1960–1998 period (Persson and Tabellini, 2003) produce similar ﬁndings.
17In the last period, the policy function is diﬀerent, but also unique.
10Finally, Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005) report cross-section and time-series evidence of a
negative relationship between fertility and social security transfers (104 countries in 1997, and
post-war data for the U.S. and European countries, respectively). Boldrin et al. (2005) interpret
this evidence as support for their view that increased social security transfers caused a fall in
fertility. Our model suggests a mechanism with reversed causality.
The model also replicates the apparently non-monotone empirical relationship between the
share of elderly in the population and public pension payments per retiree: For the 1880–1930
period, Lindert (1994) estimates an elasticity of the pension share in GDP with respect to the
share of elderly that is larger than unity. The OECD data suggest a hump-shaped relationship
between the share of the elderly and public pension payments per retiree (Lindert, 1996), and
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004) conclude that there is no clear relationship.18 The model
can account for these observations, because it features an inverse-U shaped relationship between
the share of elderly and public pension payments per retiree (wtτW
t νt), and because population
growth rates have on average declined over time. Our model therefore predicts population ageing
to lead to a rise in the pension share of GDP but eventually, a decline of social security beneﬁts
per retiree.
Another prediction of the model relates to the extent of “risk sharing” induced by the political
choice of tax rates.19 Since aggregate labor and capital income shares are constant in the model,
the randomness of population growth generates old-age consumption risk for a newborn worker.
The endogenous response of taxes to demographic developments reduces this consumption risk.
Abstracting from terms known as of time t, old-age consumption is given by
ln[c2,t+1] ≃ (1 − α)ln[νt+1] −
 
0 if τt+1 = 0,
ln[ω + νt+1(1 + αβ)] if τt+1 > 0.
(The extra term in the second line reﬂects the dependence of δ(τW(νt+1)) on population growth.
If τt+1 does not vary with the population growth rate, then the same relationship applies as
when τt+1 = 0.) Diﬀerentiating with respect to νt+1 yields
dln[c2,t+1]
dνt+1 = 1−α
νt+1 if the tax rate is not












in politico-economic equilibrium with strictly positive tax rates. Since τt+1 < 1, the endogenous
choice of tax rates reduces the exposure of old-age consumption to demographic risk.
For a diﬀerent perspective on this political allocation of consumption risk, consider the ratio







If tax rates are independent of population growth, this ratio has a unitary elasticity with respect
to the contemporaneous population growth rate. In politico-economic equilibrium with strictly
positive tax rates, in contrast, the ratio reduces to c2,t/c1,t = ω(1+βet)/(1+αβ) (which further
simpliﬁes to ω + αβνt+1 in the absence of demographic risk). That is, the consumption ratio is
18Based on data for the United States and 12 European countries over the period 1965–92, Razin, Sadka and
Swagel (2002) argue that the dependency ratio is negatively related to per capita transfers.
19Note that, due to demographic shocks, risk is “shared” among state-contingent sets of households.
11independent of νt, but has a unitary elasticity with respect to (1+βet); with i.i.d. demographic
shocks, the consumption ratio is constant.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. Consider the politico-economic equilibrium under Assumption 1.
(i) There exists an equilibrium with policy functions τ( ) independent of s. These policy
functions are the unique equilibrium policy functions in ﬁnite-horizon economies.
(ii) The tax functions in that equilibrium are given by τ(st−1,νt) = τW
t . These policy
functions increase in ω and decrease in α, β and νt. They imply a pension share of GDP
that increases in the fraction of retirees in the population; social security beneﬁts per retiree
that eventually decrease in this fraction; and reduced old-age consumption risk, compared to a
situation with exogenous tax rates.
3 Elastic Labor Supply and Multiple Policy Instruments
The results in the previous section followed under the assumption that labor is supplied inelas-
tically, and that policymakers have access to a single policy instrument (transfers from workers
to retirees). Both these assumptions are not fully satisfactory. First, labor supply is likely to re-
spond to demographic developments both directly and, through induced policy eﬀects, indirectly.
Modeling labor supply therefore is important in its own right, but also because deadweight losses
might dampen the upward pressure on social security taxes. Second, the opposition of young
voters against social security taxes might be stiﬂed if additional policy instruments are available
to reap the general equilibrium eﬀects Bt. To assess the robustness of our ﬁndings, it is therefore
important to model the set of policy instruments chosen by the political process, and how this
set of instruments develops during the demographic transition.
To address these concerns, we extend the model of the previous section. We introduce an
endogenous labor-leisure choice as well as an additional tax on labor income, levied at rate θt,
whose revenue is reimbursed to young households. In the previous setup with inelastic labor
supply, such a tax-cum-reimbursement would have had no eﬀects. With elastic labor supply, in
contrast, the new instrument makes it possible to monopolize labor supply and thus, depress
savings of the young without having to transfer resources to the old. We interpret this tax as
distortive labor market regulation.
We assume for tractability that a worker’s felicity function is separable in consumption and
leisure, xt. The indirect utility function deﬁned in (1) is thus replaced by
Ut = max
st,xt
u(c1,t) + v(xt) + βEt[u(c2,t+1)] s.t. household budget set,
where v( ) is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and concave, and satisﬁes limx→0 v′(x) =
∞. A young household’s time endowment is normalized to one. While the per-worker tax rev-
enue wt(1−xt)τt continues to fund social security, the additional tax revenue wt(1−xt)θt funds
a lump-sum transfer to workers. The budget constraint of a worker thus reads
wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − θt) + Tt = c1,t + st,
where, in equilibrium, Tt = wt(1 − xt)θt. Second-period consumption is still given by c2,t+1 =
stRt+1 + bt+1, where bt+1 = νt+1wt+1τt+1(1 − xt+1).
12Savings and labor supply of a worker are characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions
u′(c1,t) = βEt[u′(c2,t+1)Rt+1],
u′(c1,t)wt(1 − τt − θt) = v′(xt),
subject to the budget set described earlier. Conditional on the anticipated values for taxes and
aggregate leisure, τ(st,νt+1), θ(st,νt+1), and ˜ X(st,νt+1), respectively, the household’s ﬁrst-order
conditions and budget constraint map (st−1,νt), aggregate savings and leisure, as well as the
contemporaneous tax rates into the leisure and savings choice of a worker, Xi( ) and Si( ),
respectively. Equilibrium aggregate savings and leisure functions, S( ) and X( ), respectively,
are deﬁned as ﬁxed points of the functional equations
S(st−1,νt,τt,θt;τ( ),θ( )) = Si(st−1,νt,τt,θt;X( ),S( ),τ(S( ),νt+1),θ(S( ),νt+1), ˜ X(S( ),νt+1)),
X(st−1,νt,τt,θt;τ( ),θ( )) = Xi(st−1,νt,τt,θt;X( ),S( ),τ(S( ),νt+1),θ(S( ),νt+1), ˜ X(S( ),νt+1)),
∀st−1,νt ≥ 0, 0 ≤ τt,θt, τt + θt ≤ 1.




Wθ(st−1,νt,τt,θt;τ( ),θ( )) ≡ ωu(c2,t) + νt(u(c1,t) + v(xt) + βEt[u(c2,t+1)])
subject to

        
        
st−1,νt given,
st = S(st−1,νt,τt,θt;τ( ),θ( )),
xt = X(st−1,νt,τt,θt;τ( ),θ( )),




In a rational expectations equilibrium, the anticipated policy functions coincide with the optimal
ones. Moreover, X( ) is consistent with ˜ X( ) if evaluated at the equilibrium policy functions.
To characterize the politico-economic equilibrium in closed form, we impose the same type
of functional form assumptions as before:
Assumption 2. Preferences over consumption are logarithmic: u(c) ≡ ln(c). The production
function is of the Cobb-Douglas type: w(st−1,νt,xt) ≡ A(1−α)(st−1/(νt(1−xt)))α, R(st−1,νt,xt) ≡
Aα(st−1/(νt(1 − xt)))α−1.












(1 − xt)1−α   γ(τt,et),
c2,t = sα
t−1ν1−α
t (1 − xt)1−α   δ(τt),
where the functions z( ), γ( ), and δ( ) have been deﬁned earlier. The worker’s static optimality
condition yields
v′(xt) =
(1 − τt − θt)(1 + βet)
(1 − xt)(1 − τt)
13and thus, an expression for leisure as a function of τt, θt, and et, but not (directly) of st−1:
xt = x(τt,θt,et). (8)
In parallel with the approach pursued previously, we conjecture that the equilibrium policy
functions τ( ) and θ( ) are independent of savings, such that τt+1 = τ(νt+1), θt+1 = θ(νt+1), and
det/dst = 0. In this case, future labor supply is unaﬀected by savings as well, and the objective
function Wθ( ) can be expressed as
Wθ(st−1,νt,τt,θt;τ(νt+1),θ(νt+1))
= W(st−1,νt,τt;τ(νt+1)) + g(xt,νt) + terms unaﬀected by τt,θt, subject to (8),
where the function W( ) has been deﬁned earlier and g(x,ν) ≡ ln[1−x](1−α)(ω +ν +αβν) +














with equalities if the solution is interior.
If the optimal tax rate θt > 0, then the equilibrium features the same τt as in the main model,
τW
t , since ∂xt/∂θt > 0 implies ∂g(xt,νt)/∂xt = 0. In this case, the optimal θt is pinned down
by the condition ∂g(xt,νt)/∂xt = 0 with xt evaluated at τW
t and et, the latter being a function
of the potential realizations of τW
t+1. An increase in νt or an expected increase in νt+1 then raise
θt. Moreover, if both tax rates are strictly positive, then τt + θt =
αβEt[νt+1]
αβEt[νt+1]+ω, implying that
anticipated population growth increases the total tax burden.20 Alternatively, if the optimal
tax rate θt = 0, then
∂x(τt,0,et)
∂τt = 0. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to τt then implies
once more the same choice of social security tax rate as in the basic model. Summing up, the
equilibrium policy function for the social security tax rate is the same as in the basic model,
and the equilibrium policy function for the purely distorting tax is independent of savings, as
conjectured.
The model has interesting implications for labor supply. From the worker’s static optimality
condition, v′(xt)(1−xt) is equal to 1+βet if θt = 0, and equal to a function of νt otherwise. Since
v′(xt)(1−xt) decreases in xt, equilibrium labor supply increases with future population growth
but is unaﬀected by contemporaneous demographics if θt = 0. Intuitively, with an elasticity
20The condition ∂g( )/∂xt = 0 can be rewritten as νtv
′(x( ))(1 − x( )) = (1 − α)(ω + νt + αβνt). The latter
condition uniquely pins down xt and thus, conditional on (τt,et), also θt. Letting Qt = (1−α)(ω+νt +αβνt)ν
−1
t





































t < 0, dθt/dQt < 0, and dθt/det > 0. Moreover, both τ
W
t and Qt weakly decrease in νt. The
comparative statics results then follow.
14of substitution equal to one (logarithmic preferences), contemporaneous social security taxes
do not aﬀect labor supply if they are the only taxes imposed; but anticipated social security
beneﬁts (which depend on νt+1) reduce labor supply through a wealth eﬀect. In contrast, if
θt > 0, labor supply is determined by the condition ∂g(xt,νt)/∂xt = 0 and thus, decreases in νt
but is unaﬀected by νt+1. Intuitively, if θt > 0, labor supply is under the direct control of policy
makers in the current period and therefore reﬂects the political weight of young voters (νt); it
does not reﬂect future population growth because (future) tax rates do not aﬀect the cost and
beneﬁts of increased labor supply.
Combined, these ﬁndings imply that with strictly positive tax rates τ and θ, falling popula-
tion growth rates are accompanied by rising social security taxes and rising labor supply. This
result is surprising at ﬁrst sight; it partially refutes common wisdom according to which social
security tax hikes would imply large deadweight losses, rendering the option of raising social
security taxes economically and politically infeasible.21 More generally, the result shows that the
link between social security tax rates and labor supply distortions must not be seen in isolation,
but in the context of a wider set of policy instruments that also respond to demographic change.
Beyond the implications for the social security tax rate, other predictions of the basic model
are robust as well. For example, the expression for the pension share of GDP is unchanged, as
is the consumption ratio (7). The result that the political choice of tax rates reduces old-age
consumption risk continues to hold (see Appendix A.2).
The equilibrium policy functions characterized above are the unique equilibrium policy func-
tions if we restrict attention to (the limit of) ﬁnite-horizon economies.22 This can again be seen
by a backward induction argument. In the ﬁnal period, T, the consumption of old and young
households is given by
c1,T = wT(1 − xT)(1 − τT) = A(1 − α)(sT−1/νT)α(1 − xT)1−α(1 − τT),
c2,T = Asα
T−1ν1−α(1 − xT)1−α(α + (1 − α)τT),
respectively. Logarithmic preferences over consumption as well as the worker’s static optimality
condition v′(xT)(1 − xT) = (1 − τT − θT)/(1 − τT) then imply that the ﬁrst-order conditions
with respect to τT and θT are independent of sT−1. Consequently, the policy and labor-supply
functions in the ﬁnal period only depend on the population growth rate, and the same holds
true in all preceding periods, by the arguments given before.
We summarize these ﬁndings as follows:
Proposition 2. Consider the politico-economic equilibrium under Assumption 2.
(i) There exists an equilibrium with policy functions τ( ) and θ( ) independent of s. These
policy functions are the unique equilibrium policy functions in ﬁnite-horizon economies.
(ii) The social security tax functions in that equilibrium are given by τ(st−1,νt) = τW
t , the
same functions as in the main model.
(iii) Labor supply in that equilibrium increases in future population growth, but is unaf-
fected by contemporaneous population growth if θt = 0. Conversely, labor supply decreases in
contemporaneous population growth, but is unaﬀected by future population growth if θt > 0; in
that case, higher social security taxes go hand in hand with higher labor supply.
21See, for example, Feldstein (2005).
22In the last period, the policy functions are diﬀerent, but also unique.
154 Ramsey Allocation
It is instructive to compare the politico-economic equilibrium with the allocation implemented by
a benevolent government, subject to the same set of technological and competitive-equilibrium
constraints. To simplify the derivations, we pursue a similar strategy as for the analysis of the
politico-economic equilibrium, considering ﬁrst the case with inelastic labor supply.
Conditional on a sequence of cohort-speciﬁc discount factors {ρi}, the program of the benevo-
















sj = Si(wj(1 − τj);sj,τj+1), j ≥ t,
household budget constraints.
(We assume throughout that the sequence {ρi} is declining suﬃciently quickly for this program
to be well-deﬁned.) In contrast to the program solved by the political candidates, the Ramsey
program involves the choice of a sequence of state-contingent tax rates, due to the planner’s
ability to commit. This sequence need not be optimal ex post and thus, need not satisfy ﬁxed-
point conditions as in the politico-economic equilibrium. Moreover, the Ramsey government
values the welfare of all households, not only of those currently alive and voting. In general,
the Ramsey policy therefore internalizes many more general-equilibrium eﬀects than the policy
implemented in politico-economic equilibrium.23
In Appendix A.1, we discuss the Ramsey policy in the general case. Here, we directly turn to
the characteristics of the Ramsey policy under Assumption 1. The Ramsey planner’s objective
function can then be expressed as24




ρi (ln[γ(τi,ei)] + αln[si−1] + β ln[δ(τi+1)] + αβ ln[si])
 




ρi (ln[γ(τi,ei)] + β ln[δ(τi+1)] + ln[z(τi,ei)]Γi)
 
, (9)
where we deﬁne Γi ≡ ρ−1
i [αβρi + (1 + αβ)(αρi+1 + α2ρi+2 + ...)]. (Γi is state contingent if the
planner’s marginal rate of substitution across generations varies with the state of nature realized












23Absent binding non-negativity constraints on tax rates and tax distortions, the Ramsey policy supports
the social-planner allocation, see the discussion in Appendix A.1. In the setup with labor supply distortions
analyzed below, this is no longer the case. To avoid confusion, we always refer to the benchmark as the “Ramsey
equilibrium” rather than the “social-planner allocation.”
24Note that
ln[si] ≃ αln[si−1] + ln[z(τi,ei)]
≃ α
i−t+1st−1 + α
i−t ln[z(τt,et)] + α
i−t−1 ln[z(τt+1,et+1)] + ... + ln[z(τi,ei)], i ≥ t.
16and the tax rate maximizing G( ) is given by
τG(ρt,ρt−1,EtΓt) ≡
βρt−1(1 − α) − ρt(1 + EtΓt)α
βρt−1(1 − α) + ρt(1 + EtΓt)(1 − α)
.
If this tax rate violates the non-negativity constraint, then the constrained maximum of G( )
is attained for a tax rate of zero,25 implying that the optimal tax rate is given by τG
t ≡
max(τG(ρt,ρt−1,EtΓt),0). The interior tax rate τG( ) diﬀers twofold from the corresponding
tax rate in politico-economic equilibrium, τW( ). First, the weights ω and νt are replaced by
βρt−1 and ρt, respectively. Second, the expression (1 + αβ) is replaced by the term (1 + EtΓt),
reﬂecting the fact that the Ramsey government internalizes general equilibrium eﬀects over a
much longer horizon. The ﬁrst of the two changes implies that the Ramsey tax rate is indepen-
dent of the population growth rate unless the planner’s welfare weight ρt is a function of νt. (In
politico-economic equilibrium, an interior tax rate always depends on νt.)
Turning to the choice of tax rates in periods after the initial one, i > t, the eﬀect of a
















The new term on the right-hand side of this expression reﬂects the fact that with commitment,
taxes aﬀect workers’ savings decision in the preceding period. However, this commitment ef-
fect vanishes if τi = τG(ρi,ρi−1,EiΓi).26 All interior Ramsey tax rates are therefore given by
τG(ρi,ρi−1,EiΓi).27 Whenever a non-negativity constraint is binding, the optimal tax rate in
that period is in a corner.
In the special case where {ρi}∞
i=t−1 = {ω,βνt,0,0,...}, the expression for EtΓt collapses to
αβ such that τG
t = τW
t . In another special case with geometric discounting, ρi/ρt−1 = ρi−t+1,
the expression for EtΓt reduces to α(β +ρ)/(1−αρ) and the Ramsey tax rate falls short of the
politico-economic equilibrium tax rate whenever ω or ρ is suﬃciently large or βνt is suﬃciently
small:
Geometric discounting : τG
t ≤ τW
t ⇔ ωρ ≥ βνt(1 − αρ).
Finally, with “dynastic” discounting, that is, if the planner’s welfare weights reﬂect the discount
factor of households as well as the cohort size, ρi/ρi−1 = βνi, and if the population growth rate











∝ Ei[Γi−1 − βei−1] = αβ +
αρi
ρi−1
(1 + EiΓi) − β
α
α + (1 − α)τi
.
The last expression equals zero for τi = τ
G(ρi,ρi−1,EiΓi).
27Moreover, βei = EiΓi in this case and an interior policy therefore also solves
ρi−1β
1 − α




(1 + βei) = 0,
which corresponds to the condition ni = 0 in the general case discussed in the Appendix. To see that βei = EiΓi,






















17is i.i.d. with mean ¯ ν < (αβ)−1, then EtΓt = αβ 1+¯ ν
1−αβ¯ ν and the Ramsey tax rate is smaller than
the equilibrium tax rate whenever ω is large or β¯ ν is small:
“Dynastic” discounting, i.i.d. ν : τG
t ≤ τW
t ⇔ ω ≥ 1 − αβ¯ ν.
With dynastic discounting, under interior tax rates, the Ramsey policy achieves c2,t = c1,t in all
periods and states of nature.
With endogenous labor supply, under Assumption 2, the government’s objective function






hi(xi) subject to (8),
where the function G( ) is deﬁned in (9) and hi(x) ≡ ρi−1β(1 − α)ln[1 − x] + ρi(v(x) + (1 −

















+ χi = 0, i > t,
where ζi and χi denote the non-negative multipliers associated with the non-negativity con-
straints on tax rates. These conditions imply that with geometrically declining social welfare
weights, the steady-state Ramsey tax rate τ is lower than in the case with inelastic labor sup-
ply, τ ≤ τG
t .28 Intuitively, absent non-negativity constraints on tax rates, the government would
like to impose the same social security tax rate as in the case with inelastic labor supply and
eliminate the resulting distortions by setting θ < 0. The non-negativity constraint renders such
a strategy unfeasible. Balancing its allocative and distributive goals, and in contrast with the
political process, the government therefore reduces the social security tax rate in response to
the presence of tax distortions.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. Consider the Ramsey policy. With inelastic labor supply, under Assumption 1,
tax rates are given by τG
i for all i ≥ t. With elastic labor supply, under Assumption 2 and with
geometrically declining social welfare weights, the steady-state social security tax rate is lower
than in the case with inelastic labor supply.
5 Quantitative Implications
In the previous sections, we have characterized the politico-economic equilibrium and the Ramsey
allocation. We now apply these results to forecast the likely development of social security
28With geometrically declining social welfare weights, τ and θ cannot both be strictly positive. (For ρ = β
1−α
α(1+β),
the unconstrained τ and θ both equal zero. For any other value of ρ, either τ or θ is in a corner.) At least one
of the two tax rates must therefore be zero. If τ is zero, the result immediately follows. Otherwise, θ = 0 and
τ > 0. The second ﬁrst-order condition then implies h
′
i(xi) ≤ 0 (since
∂xi(τi,0,τi+1)







∂τi = 0 (since
∂xi(τi,0,τi+1)
∂τi = 0). Since
∂xi(τi,0,τi+1)
∂τi+1 > 0, we conclude that
∂G( )
∂τi ≥ 0
and thus, due to monotonicity of
∂G( )
∂τi , that τ ≤ max(τ
G,0).
18taxes and contributions, and to quantitatively assess the discrepancy between politico-economic
equilibrium and a benchmark Ramsey allocation. We consider the case with elastic labor supply
(Assumption 2), take one period in the model to correspond to thirty years in the data, and
consider a risk-free environment.29
We assume the following parameter values: Based on ﬁndings in Piketty and Saez (2003),
we set α to 0.2815.30 We set νt equal to the estimated or projected thirty-year gross U.S.
population growth rate, based on series reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (middle series).
We compute these thirty-year growth rates for the base years 1970,1980,...,2050. This allows
us to construct three sequences of model predictions, each with a period length of thirty years.
The ﬁrst such sequence begins in the year 1970, the second one in the year 1980, and the third
one in the year 1990. When reporting the model predictions, we merge these three sequences.
Figure 1 displays the postulated population growth rates. These growth rates imply that the
peak of the demographic transition has been surpassed by the second half of the twenty-ﬁrst
century.







Figure 1: Population growth rate.
To calibrate β and ω, we use two relationships between the model parameters that theory
predicts to hold in politico-economic equilibrium. The ﬁrst of the two dependencies between β
and ω arises from the postulated equality of the actual social security tax rate in the year 2000,
12.4 percent, and the predicted tax rate conditional on α and ν2000. The second dependency
between β and ω, β = ω
R−να, follows from evaluating the household’s Euler equation in steady
state at the equilibrium tax rate.31 To exploit this second relationship, we approximate “the”
annual U.S. interest rate by a weighted average of the returns on diﬀerent asset classes, based on
29Since τ
W does not depend on future population growth rates, it is unaﬀected by uncertainty about future
population growth rates as well.
30Piketty and Saez (2003) report estimates of α for post-war U.S. data. We use the average of their estimates
over the period 1970–2003.
31As the economy is not in steady state in the year 2000, the condition only holds as an approximation.
Robustness checks (see below) show that the validity of the simulations is not aﬀected by this approximation.
19estimates by Campbell and Viceira (2005) and the Federal Reserve Board.32 We then account
for the fact that real-world interest rates include a growth component that is absent in our
model, to arrive at an adjusted annual gross interest rate of 1.0302.33 The thirty-year gross
interest rate corresponding to the variable R in the model thus is given by 2.4430.
Solving the two relationships jointly yields β = 0.4469 and ω = 0.9176. These values are
plausible. On the one hand, they correspond to an annual discount factor of 0.9735. On the other
hand, they appear consistent with the notion that old and young voters have approximately the
same per-capita inﬂuence. By imposing that the time spent working and in retirement are of
equal length, the model overstates the political inﬂuence of retirees; a value for ω that is smaller
than unity counterbalances this eﬀect. (We conduct robustness checks by imposing larger or
smaller values for the annual U.S. interest rate and thus, smaller or larger values for β and
ω. The simulation results are qualitatively unaﬀected; the predicted sequences for the social
security tax rate are identical.)
Finally, when computing labor supply, we assume that v(x) ≡ mln(x) with m = 2.3867.
This value implies that the long-run labor supply in politico-economic equilibrium (evaluated at
the population growth rate of the year 2000) satisﬁes 1 − x = 0.35.
Figure 2 displays the model predictions for τW and τW + θW in the period from 1970 to
2050. The secular decrease in the population growth rate leads to a pronounced and persistent
increase in the social security tax rate and thus, the pension share of GDP. This increase in
intergenerational transfers is accompanied by a decrease in the purely distortive tax, θW, which
drops to zero by 2030.
Recall that we calibrated the model to match the social security tax rate in the year 2000.
Figure 3 makes clear that, conditional on this normalization, the model does a good job in terms
of replicating the actual social security tax rates between 1970 and 2000. Figure 3 also displays
the out-of-sample predictions. Under the assumption of no structural change except for the
demographic transition, the model predicts social security tax rates to rise for the foreseeable
future until leveling oﬀ at around 16 percent by the middle of the century (see Table 1).
To assess the implications of the predicted τ-sequence for social security beneﬁts, we compare
the model predictions with the conclusions drawn in the 2006 Annual Report of the Social
Security Board of Trustees.34 According to that Report, “the projected inﬁnite horizon shortfall
[of social security] could be eliminated with an immediate increase in the combined payroll tax
rate from 12.4 percent to about 16.1 percent. This shortfall could also be eliminated if all
current and future beneﬁts were immediately reduced by 22 percent” (p. 55). The model, in
32Campbell and Viceira (2005) report annualized gross returns for 90-day treasury-bills (1.0152), 5-year
treasury-bonds (1.0289), and stocks (1.0783) for the period 1952–2002. We approximate the average return
on savings by a weighted average of these returns (1.0483) where the weights are proportional to the relative
size of “deposits”, “credit market instruments”, and “equity shares at market value, directly held plus indirectly
held” in the balance sheets of households and non-proﬁt organizations (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual Flows and Outstandings, several years [we use
averages for the period 1955–2002]). This yields an annual gross interest rate of ˜ R = 1.0483.
33Relaxing the assumption of constant productivity, we have At+1 = AtγA with γA > 1. Similarly, we have
st+1 = stγs with γs > 1. Since Rt ∝ Ats
α−1
t−1 , a balanced growth path with constant interest rate requires
γs = γ
1/(1−α)
A . Moreover, from the law of motion for savings (which is unaﬀected by changes in γA) it follows that
γs ∝ Ats
α−1
t−1 . We conclude that, on a balanced growth path, R increases by a factor of γ
1/(1−α)
A if the gross growth
rate of A increases from unity to γA. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, multifactor productivity of
private businesses grew by a factor of 1.8681 between 1952 and 2002 (http://www.bls.gov/mfp/home.htm, series
MPU740023 (K)). This implies γA = 1.0126. The result then follows.
34The 2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, see http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.










Table 1: Predicted social security tax rate
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
τW 0.1386 0.1429 0.1582 0.1553 0.1596 0.1628 0.1633 0.1620
turn, predicts τ to reach 16 percent only after 2050, suggesting that social security beneﬁts will
fall below their promised levels, although by less than 22 percent.35
Similar conclusions follow from comparing the model predictions with the reform proposed
by Diamond and Orszag (see, for example, Diamond and Orszag, 2005). These authors suggest,
among a series of other measures, a gradual increase in payroll tax rates (12.5 percent in 2015,
13.2 percent in 2035, 14.2 percent in 2055, and 15.4 percent in 2078, and rising thereafter),
combined with gradual beneﬁt cuts by up to 9 percent for workers with average earnings, de-
pending on age. The tax increases predicted by the model exceed Diamond and Orszag’s (2005)
proposals, suggesting that the political process will implement only minor cuts in social security
beneﬁts.
We noted earlier that the predicted increase in the social security tax rate τW is accompanied
by a decrease in the purely distortive tax, θW. The model predicts that as a result of these
two opposing developments, the sum of the two tax rates follows a U-shaped path during the
period 1970 to 2050, with a minimum being reached in the year 2020. Figure 4 displays the
implications for labor supply of these trends. From 1970 until 2020, with both τt and θt strictly
positive, the fall in the population growth rate pushes labor supply upwards—in contrast with
35The model abstracts from the social security trust fund whose net asset position is predicted to worsen. This
eﬀect dampens the pressure exerted on the social security system.





predicted and actual SS tax rate
Figure 3: Social security tax rate: Predicted [•] and actual [OASDI, ⋆].
the common view that higher social security taxes go hand in hand with a reduction in hours
(e.g., Feldstein, 2005). This implication of the model is broadly consistent with the data.36
After 2020, when θt drops to zero, labor supply reﬂects the movement of anticipated population
growth rates, for reasons discussed earlier. In the medium term, labor supply therefore stabilizes
on a comparatively high level.
We conclude this section with a comparison of the equilibrium outcome on the one hand
and the allocation implemented by a Ramsey government with dynastic social welfare weights
on the other. We consider a hypothetical steady-state with the population growth rate equal to
its year-2000 value. Table 2 reports the results.
Table 2: Steady-state comparison




1 − x 0.3500 0.3650
Both the political process and the Ramsey government implement strictly positive social
security taxes, but only the political process implements a strictly positive θ. Relative to the
36Labor supply in the U.S. increased more strongly than predicted by the model, not least because of signiﬁcant
changes in the composition of labor supply across demographic groups. See, for example, McGrattan and Rogerson
(2004).










Figure 4: Predicted labor supply (1 − x).
policy choices by the Ramsey government with dynastic welfare weights, social security tax rates
in politico-economic equilibrium are 57 percent “too high,” and total tax rates are 101 percent
“too high.” The politico-economic equilibrium features lower labor supply than the Ramsey
allocation and a higher steady-state ratio of old- and young-age consumption. (Accordingly, the
interest rate in politico-economic equilibrium is higher, and the capital-labor ratio lower.)
We conduct a series of robustness checks with respect to the fundamental model parameters.
These checks conﬁrm the central ﬁndings, according to which equilibrium social security taxes
are positive and “too high” relative to the Ramsey tax rates. We also solve numerically for
the equilibrium under the assumption of CIES preferences with an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, ε. With non-logarithmic preferences, ε < 1 (ε > 1), the tax function is no longer
independent of s; instead, it is negatively (positively) sloped.37
6 Conclusion
We have argued that the political support for intergenerational transfers reﬂects the inter-
ests of all voters rather than just a working median voter. The micro-political foundation
for that view—probabilistic voting—is natural and has plausible implications. Introducing the
probabilistic-voting assumption in the standard Diamond (1965) model preserves that model’s
tractability and delivers intuitive and novel results in a strikingly transparent fashion.
Predictions of the model accord well with frequently expressed notions in the social security
debate. For example, in response to population ageing, social security beneﬁts are predicted
to be cut, sooner or later. Such cuts do not herald the dismantling of pay-as-you-go social
security systems, however. To the contrary, social security taxes and the GDP-share of the
social security system will continue to grow. The model also gives meaning to the notion that
social security constitutes a burden for future generations—even if these generations are not
37Details of these robustness checks are discussed in Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2005).
23committed to honor existing social security promises; for in the model, political competition
resolves the conﬂict between old and young voters by shifting some of the cost of the social
security system to future generations. As a consequence, intergenerational transfers are too
large, relative to a system balancing the interests of all generations.
We have assumed that the government’s budget is balanced in each period. Relaxing this
assumption introduces two further political choices in each period, one regarding the issuance
of new debt, the other regarding the default rate on maturing debt. The debt issuance choice
is constrained by the fact that agents investing in government debt foresee the possibility of
a (partial) default by future political decision makers. Debt can therefore only be issued to
the extent that a political incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed. But this implies that
allowing for the issuance of defaultable government debt does not aﬀect the politico-economic
equilibrium. Since voters only care about the real allocation, the economic equivalence between
social security and debt-plus-tax policies extends to the political sphere if both debt- and tax
policies lack commitment.38
Since the model is very tractable, it lends itself to a variety of interesting extensions. We
have analyzed one, central extension with endogenous labor supply, tax distortions, and multiple
policy instruments. This extension proved the predicted support for social security to be a
robust result, a novel ﬁnding in the literature. Another extension, due to Song (2005), features
intragenerational heterogeneity and analyzes the interaction between social security transfers and
wealth inequality. Further possible extensions might address questions relating to the interaction
between social security and other policies or household choices. We leave these topics for future
research.
38However, the equilibrium choice of policy instruments is no longer uniquely pinned down in that case, since
diﬀerent combinations of government debt, social security transfers, and taxes support the same net transfers and
the same allocation. On economic equivalence see, for example, Rangel (1997) or Niepelt (2005). On politico-
economic equivalence, see Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2007).
24A Appendix
A.1 Ramsey Policy
The eﬀect on the Ramsey planner’s objective function of a marginal increase in τi is given by
Et
 
wi(ρi−1βu′(c2,i)νi − ρiu′(c1,i)) + Ei
 
, i ≥ t, (10)
where Ei summarizes the general equilibrium eﬀects of a change in τi, as described below. When
evaluated at i = t, this expression diﬀers twofold from (5). First, the direct welfare eﬀects
of redistribution from young to old agents are weighted diﬀerently (the relative weight ω/νt is
replaced by the relative weight ρt−1β/ρt). Second, the general-equilibrium eﬀects of the policy
change are evaluated diﬀerently under the Ramsey policy: Et replaces νtBt.39
To derive Ei, we ﬁrst introduce some notation. Let ni ≡ ρi−1βu′(c2,i)νi−ρiu′(c1,i) denote the
net social beneﬁt of transferring one unit of resources in period i from young to old households,
and let Ii denote the eﬀect on the government’s objective function of a marginal increase in










which simpliﬁes to Et[w′
i+1(τi+1−1)ni+1]. The total eﬀect on the government’s objective function
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Since under commitment, a change of tax rate also aﬀects savings in the preceding period if
















Notice that Et contains a term that corresponds to the expression νtBt in the political program
(dSt/dτt It includes the term ρt−1βEt[u′(c2,t+1)νt+1(τt+1−1)w′
t+1]), as well as many additional
terms capturing welfare eﬀects on yet unborn generations.
These derivations imply that the marginal eﬀect in (10) equals zero if ni = 0 for all i ≥ t
in all states of nature. In this case, a small change of tax rate has neither direct nor indirect
eﬀects on the government’s objective as the government is indiﬀerent at the margin between
redistributing from or to workers in any period and state of nature. In fact, if it is feasible
to set taxes to achieve ni = 0 for all i ≥ t and all states of nature, then such a policy solves
the Ramsey program. This follows from the fact that the condition ni = 0 also solves the
corresponding social planner problem. (The distribution of consumption implemented by the
social planner is governed by the same marginal rates of substitution and transformation as
under the interior Ramsey policy. Moreover, savings choices of the social planner conform with
households’ savings choices and thus, the investment choices induced by the Ramsey policy.) An
interior Ramsey policy therefore implements the social-planner allocation. By implication, it is
39No direct welfare eﬀects from changes in savings arise since savings choices are privately optimal.
40Here, St denotes S(wt(1 − τt);τt+1). w and R denote wage and return as functions of aggregate savings. A
prime denotes the ﬁrst derivative with respect to savings.
25necessarily time-consistent. (This can also be seen from the fact that with ni = 0 for all i ≥ t











vanishes.) As we establish in Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2005), the Ramsey policy is time
consistent even if it is not interior.
A.2 Old-Age Consumption Risk with Endogenous Labor Supply
If labor supply is endogenous, it responds to taxes and thus, population growth. This introduces
a second channel for population growth to aﬀect old-age consumption, c2,t+1.
There are two cases to consider, θt+1 > 0, and θt+1 = 0. In the latter case, labor sup-
ply is unaﬀected by τt+1 and thus, contemporaneous population growth. The expression for
dln[c2,t+1]/dνt+1 therefore is unchanged from Section 2.
In the former case, labor supply is aﬀected by contemporaneous population growth. This













0 if τt+1 = 0,
1+αβ
ω+νt+1(1+αβ) if τt+1 > 0.
Since θt+1 > 0, the ﬁrst-order condition
dg(xt+1,νt+1)
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0 if τt+1 = 0,
1−α
νt+1(1 − τt+1) if τt+1 > 0.
Since v′′(x) ≤ 0, an upper bound for this expression results if v′′(x) approaches −∞ and τt+1 = 0.
A lower bound, in contrast, results if v′′(x) = 0 and τt+1 is marginally positive:
−
ω














νt+1 . We conclude that the absolute value of the derivative is weakly
smaller than the absolute value of the derivative when tax rates are constant, that is, the
exposure to risk is lower than in the situation with exogenous tax rates.
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